UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
450 Fifth Street Northwest, Suite 8000
Washington, DC 20530
STATE OF ARIZONA
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
441 Fourth Street Northwest, Suite 600 South
Washington, DC 20001
STATE OF FLORIDA
PL-01, The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399
STATE OF MICHIGAN
525 W. Ottawa Street
Lansing, MI 48933
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
14th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
STATE OF TENNESSEE
500 Charlotte Avenue
Nashville, TN 37202
STATE OF TEXAS
300 W.15th Street, 7th Floor
Austin, TX 78701
and
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 1 of 57
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COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Plaintiffs,
v.
US AIRWAYS GROUP, INC.
111 W. Rio Salado Parkway
Tempe, AZ 85281
and
AMR CORPORATION
4333 Amon Carter Boulevard
Fort Worth, TX 76155
Defendants.
AMENDED COMPLAINT
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the Attorney General of the
United States, and the States of Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, the
Commonwealths of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the District of Columbia (“Plaintiff States”),
acting by and through their respective Attorneys General, bring this civil action under federal
antitrust law to enjoin the planned merger of two of the nation’s five major airlines, US Airways
Group, Inc. (“US Airways”) and AMR Corporation (“American”), and to obtain equitable and
other relief as appropriate.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1. Millions of passengers depend on the airline industry to travel quickly, efficiently, and
safely between various cities in the United States and throughout the world. Since 1978, the
nation has relied on competition among airlines to promote affordability, innovation, and service
and quality improvements. In recent years, however, the major airlines have, in tandem, raised
fares, imposed new and higher fees, and reduced service. Competition has diminished and
consumers have paid a heavy price. This merger—by creating the world’s largest airline—
would, in the words of US Airways’ management, “finish[ ] industry evolution.” It would
reduce the number of major domestic airlines from five to four, and the number of “legacy”
airlines—today, Delta, United, American, and US Airways—from four to three. In so doing, it
threatens substantial harm to consumers. Because of the size of the airline industry, if this
merger were approved, even a small increase in the price of airline tickets, checked bags, or
flight change fees would cause hundreds of millions of dollars of harm to American consumers
annually.
2. American and US Airways compete directly on thousands of heavily traveled nonstop
and connecting routes. Millions of passengers benefit each year from head-to-head competition
that this merger would eliminate. With less competition, airlines can cut service and raise prices
with less fear of competitive responses from rivals.
3. This merger will leave three very similar legacy airlines—Delta, United, and the new
American—that past experience shows increasingly prefer tacit coordination over full-throated
competition. By further reducing the number of legacy airlines and aligning the economic
incentives of those that remain, the merger of US Airways and American would make it easier
for the remaining airlines to cooperate, rather than compete, on price and service. That enhanced
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cooperation is unlikely to be significantly disrupted by Southwest and JetBlue, which, while
offering important competition on the routes they fly, have less extensive domestic and
international route networks than the legacy airlines.
4. US Airways’ own executives—who would run the new American—have long been
“proponents of consolidation.” US Airways believes that the industry—before 2005—had “too
many” competitors, causing an “irrational business model.” Since 2005, there has been a wave
of consolidation in the industry. US Airways has cheered these successive mergers, with its
CEO stating in 2011 that “fewer airlines” is a “good thing.” US Airways’ President explained
this thinking that same year: “Three successful fare increases – [we are] able to pass along to
customers because of consolidation.” (emphasis added). Similarly, he boasted at a 2012 industry
conference: “Consolidation has also . . . allowed the industry to do things like ancillary revenues
[e.g., checked bag and ticket change fees] . . . . That is a structural permanent change to the
industry and one that’s impossible to overstate the benefit from it.” In essence, industry
consolidation has left fewer, more-similar airlines, making it easier for the remaining airlines to
raise prices, impose new or higher baggage and other ancillary fees, and reduce capacity and
service. This merger positions US Airways’ management to continue the trend—at the expense
of consumers.
5. US Airways intends to do just that. If this merger were approved, US Airways would no
longer need to offer low-fare options for certain travelers. For example, US Airways employs
“Advantage Fares,” an aggressive discounting strategy aimed at undercutting the other legacy
airlines’ nonstop fares with cheaper connecting service. US Airways’ hubs are in cities that
generate less lucrative nonstop traffic than the other legacy airlines’ hubs. To compensate, US
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Airways uses its Advantage Fares to attract additional passengers on flights connecting through
its hubs.
6. The other legacy airlines take a different approach. If, for example, United offers
nonstop service on a route, and Delta and American offer connecting service on that same route,
Delta and American typically charge the same price for their connecting service as United
charges for its nonstop service. As American executives observed, the legacy airlines “generally
respect the pricing of the non-stop carrier [on a given route],” even though it means offering
connecting service at the same price as nonstop service. But American, Delta, and United
frequently do charge lower prices for their connecting service on routes where US Airways
offers nonstop service. They do so to respond to US Airways’ use of Advantage Fares on other
routes.
7. If the merger were approved, US Airways’ economic rationale for offering Advantage
Fares would likely go away. The merged airline’s cost of sticking with US Airways’ one-stop,
low-price strategy would increase. Delta and United would likely undercut the merged firm on a
larger number of nonstop routes. At the same time, the revenues generated from Advantage
Fares would shrink as American’s current nonstop routes would cease to be targets for
Advantage Fares. The bottom line is that the merged airline would likely abandon Advantage
Fares, eliminating significant competition and causing consumers to pay hundreds of millions of
dollars more.
8. Consumers will likely also be harmed by the planned merger because American had a
standalone plan to emerge from bankruptcy poised to grow. American planned to expand
domestically and internationally, adding service on nearly 115 new routes. To support its plan,
American recently made the largest aircraft order in industry history.
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9. American’s standalone plan would have bucked current industry trends toward capacity
reductions and less competition. US Airways called American’s growth plan “industry
destabilizing” and worried that American’s plan would cause other carriers to react “with their
own enhanced growth plans . . . .” The result would be to increase competitive pressures
throughout the industry. After the merger, US Airways’ current executives—who would manage
the merged firm—would be able to abandon American’s efforts to expand and instead continue
the industry’s march toward higher prices and less service. As its CEO candidly stated earlier
this year, US Airways views this merger as “the last major piece needed to fully rationalize the
industry.”
10. Passengers to and from the Washington, D.C. area are likely to be particularly hurt. To
serve Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (“Reagan National”), a carrier must have
“slots,” which are government-issued rights to take off and land. US Airways currently holds
55% of the slots at Reagan National and the merger would increase the percentage of slots held
by the combined firm to 69%. The combined airline would have a monopoly on 63% of the
nonstop routes served out of the airport. Competition at Reagan National cannot flourish where
one airline increasingly controls an essential ingredient to competition. Without slots, other
airlines cannot enter or expand the number of flights that they offer on other routes. As a result,
Washington, D.C. area passengers would likely see higher prices and fewer choices if the merger
were approved.
11. Notwithstanding their prior unequivocal statements about the effects of consolidation, the
defendants will likely claim that the elimination of American as a standalone competitor will
benefit consumers. They will argue that Advantage Fares will continue, existing capacity levels
and growth plans will be maintained, and unspecified or unverified “synergies” will materialize,
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creating the possibility of lower fares. The American public has seen this before. Commenting
on a commitment to maintain service levels made by two other airlines seeking approval for a
merger in 2010, the CEO of US Airways said: “I’m hopeful they’re just saying what they need
. . . to get this [transaction] approved.” By making claims about benefits that are at odds with
their prior statements on the likely effects of this merger, that is precisely what the merging
parties’ executives are doing here—saying what they believe needs to be said to pass antitrust
scrutiny.
12. There is no reason to accept the likely anticompetitive consequences of this merger. Both
airlines are confident they can and will compete effectively as standalone companies. A
revitalized American is fully capable of emerging from bankruptcy proceedings on its own with
a competitive cost structure, profitable existing business, and plans for growth. US Airways
today is competing vigorously and earning record profits. Executives of both airlines have
repeatedly stated that they do not need this merger to succeed.
13. The merger between US Airways and American would likely substantially lessen
competition, and tend to create a monopoly, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 18. Therefore, this merger should be permanently enjoined.
II. JURISDICTION, INTERSTATE COMMERCE, AND VENUE
14. The United States brings this action, and this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over
this action, under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25, to prevent and
restrain US Airways and American Airlines from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
15. The Plaintiff States bring this action under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26,
to prevent and restrain US Airways and American Airlines from violating Section 7 of the
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Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18. The Plaintiff States, by and through their respective
Attorneys General, bring this action as parens patriae on behalf of the citizens, general welfare,
and economy of each of their states.
16. The defendants are engaged in, and their activities substantially affect, interstate
commerce, and commerce in each of the Plaintiff States. US Airways and American Airlines
each annually transport millions of passengers across state lines throughout this country,
generating billions of dollars in revenue while doing so.
17. Venue is proper under Section 12 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22. This Court also
has personal jurisdiction over each defendant. Both defendants are found and transact business
in this judicial district.
III. THE DEFENDANTS AND THE TRANSACTION
18. Defendant US Airways Group, Inc., is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Tempe,
Arizona. Last year, it flew over fifty million passengers to approximately 200 locations
worldwide, taking in more than $13 billion in revenue. US Airways operates hubs in Phoenix,
Charlotte, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.
19. US Airways is performing exceptionally well. In 2012, it enjoyed record profits. It is
operating at high load factors—the percentage of seats sold on its flights—and has a national and
international route network, alliances with international airlines, a strong brand name, modern
equipment, and a competitive cost structure. In mid-2012, US Airways’ CEO, touting the
airline’s “record second quarter results,” told Dow Jones that the company “has a great business
model that works and we certainly don’t need to merge with another airline.”
20. Defendant AMR Corporation is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Fort Worth,
Texas. AMR Corporation is the parent company of American Airlines. Last year, American
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flew over eighty million passengers to approximately 250 locations worldwide, taking in more
than $24 billion in revenue. American operates hubs in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago,
Dallas, and Miami. The American Airlines brand is “one of the most recognized . . . in the
world.”
21. In November 2011, American filed for bankruptcy reorganization and is currently under
the supervision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. American
adopted and implemented a standalone business plan designed “to restore American to industry
leadership, profitability and growth.” While in bankruptcy, American management “pursued and
successfully implemented” key provisions of this plan, including revenue and network
enhancements, as well as “restructuring efforts [that] have encompassed labor cost savings,
managerial efficiencies, fleet reconfiguration, and other economies . . . .” That work has paid
off. American reported that its revenue growth has “outpaced” the industry since entering
bankruptcy and in its most recent quarterly results reported a company record-high $5.6 billion
in revenues, with $357 million in profits. Under experienced and sophisticated senior
management, American’s restructuring process has positioned it to produce “industry leading
profitability.”
As recently as January 8, 2013, American’s management presented plans to
emerge from bankruptcy that would increase the destinations American serves in the United
States and the frequency of its flights, and position American to compete independently as a
profitable airline with aggressive plans for growth.
22. US Airways sees American the same way. Its CEO observed in December 2011 that
“A[merican] is not going away, they will be stronger post-bankruptcy because they will have less
debt and reduced labor costs.” A US Airways’ executive vice president similarly wrote in July
2012 that “[t]here is NO question about AMR’s ability to survive on a standalone basis.”
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23. US Airways and American agreed to merge on February 13, 2013. US Airways
shareholders would own 28 percent of the combined airline, while American shareholders,
creditors, labor unions, and employees would own 72 percent. The merged airline would operate
under the American brand name, but the new American would be run by US Airways
management.
IV. THE RELEVANT MARKETS
A. Scheduled Air Passenger Service Between Cities
24. Domestic scheduled air passenger service enables consumers to travel quickly and
efficiently between various cities in the United States. Air travel offers passengers significant
time savings and convenience over other forms of travel. For example, a flight from
Washington, D.C. to Detroit takes just over an hour of flight time. Driving between the two
cities takes at least eight hours. A train between the two cities takes more than fifteen hours.
25. Due to time savings and convenience afforded by scheduled air passenger service, few
passengers would substitute other modes of transportation (car, bus, or train) for scheduled air
passenger service in response to a small but significant industry-wide fare increase. Another
way to say this, as described in the Fed. Trade Comm’n & U.S. Dep’t of Justice Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (2010), and endorsed by courts in this Circuit, is that a hypothetical
monopolist of all domestic scheduled air passenger service likely would increase its prices by at
least a small but significant and non-transitory amount. Scheduled air passenger service,
therefore, constitutes a line of commerce and a relevant product market within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
26. A “city pair” is comprised of a flight’s departure and arrival cities. For example, a flight
departing from Washington and arriving in Chicago makes up the Washington-Chicago city pair.
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Passengers seek to depart from airports close to where they live and work, and arrive at airports
close to their intended destinations. Most airline travel is related to business, family events, and
vacations. Thus, most passengers book flights with their origins and destinations predetermined.
Few passengers who wish to fly from one city to another would likely switch to flights between
other cities in response to a small but significant and non-transitory fare increase.
27. Airlines customarily set fares on a city pair basis. For each city pair, the degree and
nature of the competition from other airlines generally plays a large role in an airline’s pricing
decision.
28. Therefore, a hypothetical monopolist of scheduled air passenger service between specific
cities likely would increase its prices by at least a small but significant and non-transitory
amount. Accordingly, each city pair is a relevant geographic market and section of the country
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
29. Consumer preferences also play a role in airline pricing and are relevant for the purpose
of analyzing the likely effects of the proposed merger. Some passengers prefer nonstop service
because it saves travel time; some passengers prefer buying tickets at the last minute; others
prefer service at a particular airport within a metropolitan area. For example, most business
customers traveling to and from downtown Washington prefer service at Reagan National over
other airports in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. Through a variety of fare restrictions
and rules, airlines can profitably raise prices for some of these passengers without raising prices
for others. Thus, the competitive effects of the proposed merger may vary among passengers
depending on their preferences for particular types of service or particular airports.
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B. Takeoff and Landing Slots at Reagan National Airport
30. Reagan National is one of only four airports in the country requiring slots for takeoffs
and landings. Slots are expensive (often valued at over $2 million per slot), difficult to obtain,
and only rarely change hands between airlines. There are no alternatives to slots for airlines
seeking to enter or expand their service at Reagan National.
31. Reagan National is across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C., and, due to its
proximity to the city and direct service via the Metro, airlines actively seek to serve passengers
flying into and out of Reagan National. Airlines do not view service at other airports as adequate
substitutes for service offered at Reagan National for certain passengers, and thus they are
unlikely to switch away from buying or leasing slots at Reagan National in response to a small
but significant increase in the price of slots. Airlines pay significant sums for slots at Reagan
National, despite having the option of serving passengers through the region’s other airports. A
hypothetical monopolist of slots at Reagan National likely would increase its prices by at least a
small but significant and non-transitory amount. Thus, slots at Reagan National Airport
constitute a line of commerce, section of the country, and relevant market within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
V. THE MERGER IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS
A. Industry Background
32. Today, four network or “legacy” airlines remain in the United States: American,
US Airways, United, and Delta. These four have extensive national and international networks,
connections to hundreds of destinations, established brand names, and strong frequent flyer
reward programs. In addition, there are non-network airlines, including Southwest Airlines and a
handful of smaller firms, which typically do not offer “hub-and-spoke” service.
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33. Airlines compete in many ways. One is the price of a ticket. Airlines also compete based
on: nonstop versus connecting flights; number of destinations served; convenient flight
schedules; passenger comfort and seating policies; choices for classes of service; carry-on
baggage policies; the degree of personal service at ticket counters and boarding areas; onboard
meal and drink service; in-flight entertainment; and the quality and generosity of frequent flyer
programs.
34. Since 2005, the U.S. airline industry has undergone significant consolidation. The
consolidation “wave” started with the 2005 merger between US Airways and America West,
creating today’s US Airways. In 2008, Delta and Northwest Airlines merged; in 2010, United
and Continental merged; and in 2011, Southwest Airlines and AirTran merged. The chart below,
in which one of US Airways’ executive vice presidents referred to industry consolidation as the
“New Holy Grail,” demonstrates that since 2005 the number of major airlines has dropped from
nine to five.
New Order
: New Holy Grail -
Industry Consolidation
2005 2008 2010
The major airlines have consolidated to 5 from 9 since 2005
53
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35. Increasing consolidation among large airlines has hurt passengers. The major airlines
have copied each other in raising fares, imposing new fees on travelers, reducing or eliminating
service on a number of city pairs, and downgrading amenities. An August 2012 presentation
from US Airways observes that consolidation has resulted in “Fewer and Larger Competitors.”
The structural change to “fewer and larger competitors” has allowed “[t]he industry” to “reap the
benefits.” Those benefits to the industry are touted by US Airways in the same presentation as
including “capacity reductions” and new “ancillary revenues” like bag fees.
B. Many Relevant Markets Are Highly Concentrated and the Planned Merger
Would Significantly Increase that Concentration
36. In 2005, there were nine major airlines. If this merger were approved, there would be
only four. The three remaining legacy airlines and Southwest would account for over 80% of the
domestic scheduled passenger service market, with the new American becoming the biggest
airline in the world.
37. Market concentration is one useful indicator of the level of competitive vigor in a market,
and the likely competitive effects of a merger. The more concentrated a market, and the more a
transaction would increase concentration in a market, the more likely it is that a transaction
would result in a meaningful reduction in competition. Concentration in relevant markets is
typically measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”). Markets in which the HHI
exceeds 2,500 points are considered highly concentrated. Post-merger increases in HHI of more
than 200 points are considered to be significant increases in concentration.
38. In more than 1,000 of the city pair markets in which American and US Airways currently
compete head-to-head, the post-merger HHI would exceed 2,500 points and the merger would
increase the HHI by more than 200 points. For example, on the Charlotte-Dallas city pair, the
post-merger HHI will increase by 4,653 to 9,324 (out of 10,000). In these markets, US Airways
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and American annually serve more than 14 million passengers and collect more than $6 billion in
fares. The substantial increases in concentration in these highly concentrated markets
demonstrate that in these relevant markets, the merger is presumed, as a matter of law, to be
anticompetitive. The relevant markets described in this paragraph are listed in Appendix A.
39. Other city pairs across the country would likely be affected by the loss of competition
stemming from this planned merger. In some of these markets, US Airways and American
compete head-to-head, often offering consumers discounted fares. If approved, this merger will
likely end much of that discounting, significantly harming consumers in the process. Moreover,
the loss of competition in these markets would increase the likelihood that the remaining airlines
can coordinate to raise price, reduce output, and diminish the quality of their services. In these
relevant markets, the merger is likely also to substantially lessen competition.
40. In the market for slots at Reagan National, the merger would result in a highly
concentrated market, with a post-merger HHI of 4,959. The merger would also significantly
increase concentration by 1,493 points. As a result, the merger should be presumed, as a matter
of law, to be anticompetitive.
C. This Merger Would Increase the Likelihood of Coordinated Behavior Among
the Remaining Network Airlines Causing Higher Fares, Higher Fees, and More
Limited Service
41. The structure of the airline industry is already conducive to coordinated behavior: Few
large players dominate the industry; each transaction is small; and most pricing is readily
transparent.
42. For example, the legacy airlines closely watch the pricing moves of their competitors.
When one airline “leads” a price increase, other airlines frequently respond by following with
price increases of their own. The initiating carrier will lead the price increase and then see if the
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other carriers will match the increase. If they do not, the initiating carrier will generally
withdraw the increase shortly thereafter.
43. The legacy airlines also use what they call “cross-market initiatives,” or “CMIs,” to deter
aggressive discounting and prevent fare wars. A CMI occurs where two or more airlines
compete against each other on multiple routes. If an airline offers discounted fares in one
market, an affected competitor often responds with discounts in another market—a CMI—where
the discounting airline prefers a higher fare. CMIs often cause an airline to withdraw fare
discounts. For example, in the fall of 2009, US Airways lowered fares and relaxed restrictions
on flights out of Detroit (a Delta stronghold) to Philadelphia. Delta responded by offering lower
fares and relaxed restrictions from Boston to Washington (a US Airways stronghold).
US Airways’ team lead for pricing observed Delta’s move and concluded “[w]e have more to
lose in BOSWAS . . . I think we need to bail on the [Detroit-Philadelphia] changes.”
44. There is also past express coordinated behavior in the industry. For example, all airlines
have complete, accurate, and real-time access to every detail of every airline’s published fare
structure on every route through the airline-owned Airline Tariff Publishing Company
(“ATPCO”). US Airways’ management has called ATPCO “a dedicated price-telegraph network
for the industry.” The airlines use ATPCO to monitor and analyze each other’s fares and fare
changes and implement strategies designed to coordinate pricing. Airlines have previously used
ATPCO to engage in coordinated behavior. In 1992, the United States filed a lawsuit to stop
several airlines, including both defendants, from using their ATPCO filings as a signaling device
to facilitate agreements on fares. That lawsuit resulted in a consent decree, now expired.
45. US Airways also has communicated directly with a competitor when it was upset by that
competitor’s efforts to compete more aggressively. In 2010, one of US Airways’ larger rivals
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extended a “triple miles” promotion that set off a market share battle among legacy carriers. The
rival airline was also expanding into new markets and was rumored to be returning planes to its
fleet that had been mothballed during the recession. US Airways’ CEO complained about these
aggressive maneuvers, stating to his senior executives that such actions were “hurting [the rival
airline’s] profitability – and unfortunately everyone else’s.” US Airways’ senior management
debated over email about how best to get the rival airline’s attention and bring it back in line
with the rest of the industry. In that email thread, US Airways’ CEO urged the other executives
to “portray[ ] these guys as idiots to Wall Street and anyone else who’ll listen.” Ultimately, to
make sure the message was received, US Airways’ CEO forwarded the email chain—and its
candid discussion about how aggressive competition would be bad for the industry—directly to
the CEO of the rival airline. (The rival’s CEO immediately responded that it was an
inappropriate communication that he was referring to his general counsel.)
46. Coordination becomes easier as the number of major airlines dwindles and their business
models converge. If not stopped, the merger would likely substantially enhance the ability of the
industry to coordinate on fares, ancillary fees, and service reductions by creating, in the words of
US Airways executives, a “Level Big 3”of network carriers, each with similar sizes, costs, and
structures.
47. Southwest, the only major, non-network airline, and other smaller carriers have networks
and business models that differ significantly from the legacy airlines. Traditionally, Southwest
and other smaller carriers have been less likely to participate in coordinated pricing or service
reductions. For example, Southwest does not charge customers for a first checked bag or ticket
change fees. Yet that has not deterred the legacy carriers from continuing, and even increasing,
those fees. In November 2011, a senior US Airways executive explained to her boss the reason:
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“Our employees know full well that the real competition for us is [American], [Delta], and
[United]. Yes we compete with Southwest and JetBlue, but the product is different and the
customer base is also different.”
1. The Merger Would Likely Result in the Elimination of US Airways’
Advantage Fares
48. On routes where one legacy airline offers nonstop service, the other legacies “generally
respect the pricing of the non-stop carrier,” as American has put it. Thus, if American offers
nonstop service from Washington to Dallas at $800 round-trip, United and Delta will, “[d]espite
having a service disadvantage,” price their connecting fares at the level of American’s nonstop
fares. The legacy carriers do this because if one airline, say Delta, were to undercut fares in
markets where American offers nonstop service, American would likely do the same in Delta’s
nonstop markets. To Delta, the cost of being undercut in its nonstop markets exceeds the benefit
it would receive from winning additional passengers in American nonstop markets.
49. US Airways, alone among the legacy carriers, has a different cost-benefit analysis for
pricing connecting routes. Although it too is a national network carrier, US Airways has hubs in
cities that generate less revenue from passengers flying nonstop than the other legacy airlines’
hubs. Because US Airways’ hubs generate less revenue from passengers flying nonstop,
US Airways must gain more revenue from connecting passengers. It gets that revenue by
offering connecting service that is up to 40% cheaper than other airlines’ nonstop service. US
Airways calls this program “Advantage Fares.”
50. Millions of consumers have benefitted. Advantage Fares offer consumers, especially
those who purchase tickets at the last minute, meaningfully lower fares. The screenshot below
from ITA Software, Airfare Matrix (“ITA”), taken on August 12, 2013, for travel departing on
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August 13 and returning August 14 from Miami to Cincinnati, shows the benefits of US
Airways’ Advantage Fare program to passengers
1
:
American is the only airline on this route to offer nonstop service, charging $740. Delta and
United do not meaningfully compete. Both charge more for their connecting service than
American charges for nonstop service. Thus, on this particular route, a passenger who chose
Delta or United would pay more for an inferior product. In contrast, US Airways’ fares today
are significantly lower than American’s fares, and offer consumers a real choice. Those
consumers who are more price conscious receive the benefit of a substantially lower-fare option.
In this case, a customer who purchased a US Airways one-stop ticket would save $269 compared
to American’s nonstop service.
51. The benefits from Advantage Fares extend to hundreds of other routes, including those
where more than one carrier offers nonstop service. The screenshot below from ITA, taken on
August 12, 2013, for travel departing on August 13 and returning August 14 from New York to
Houston, demonstrates just how dramatic the savings can be:
1
“Multiple Airlines” refers to an itinerary where a passenger uses different airlines for their
departing and returning flights.
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US Airways’ connecting fare is $870 cheaper than the other legacy carriers’ nonstop flights, and
beats JetBlue and AirTran’s fares by more than $300. Although Southwest does not participate
in the standard online travel sites, a cross-check against the Southwest website demonstrates that
US Airways also beats Southwest’s $887 nonstop fare by more than $300.
52. Other airlines have chosen to respond to Advantage Fares with their own low connecting
fares in markets where US Airways has nonstop service. That is, the other legacy airlines
undercut US Airways’ nonstop fares the same way that US Airways undercuts their nonstop
fares. The screenshot below from ITA, taken on August 12, 2013, for travel on August 13 and
returning August 14 from Charlotte to Syracuse, shows how the other legacy carriers respond to
Advantage Fares to the benefit of consumers:
Here, US Airways is the only airline to offer nonstop service, charging $685. Delta and United
undercut that price by charging $375 and $395, respectively, for connecting service. Once again,
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consumers benefit by having the option of far less expensive connecting service. A customer
who buys a Delta one-stop flight saves $310 over US Airways’ nonstop service.
53. There are over 100 routes where other carriers offer nonstop service on which US
Airways does not offer Advantage Fares. Consumers in these markets are not given the option
of a low-cost connecting alternative and are forced to pay significantly more for service. For
example, US Airways does not currently offer Advantage Fares on flights from Cincinnati to
Pittsburgh. Without the option of a low connecting fare, consumers see significantly higher
prices, as illustrated by a screenshot from ITA, taken on August 12, 2013, for travel on August
13 and returning August 14:
.
54. Advantage Fares have proven highly disruptive to the industry’s overall coordinated
pricing dynamic. An American executive expressed her frustration in September 2011 with
US Airways’ Advantage Fares, noting that US Airways was “still way undercutting us [on flights
from Boston and New York to Dallas] and getting significant share.” One response American
considered was to lower its fares on the same route. Another option was “to take up this battle
w/them again,” in an attempt to force US Airways to limit or abandon its strategy.
55. US Airways’ President acknowledged in September 2010 that its Advantage Fare
strategy “would be different if we had a different route network . . . .” Currently, US Airways’
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network structure precludes Delta and United from preventing US Airways’ aggressive “one-
stop pricing.” Because US Airways’ hubs have relatively less nonstop traffic, the other legacy
airlines cannot respond sufficiently to make Advantage Fares unprofitable. But by increasing the
size and scope of US Airways’ network, the merger makes it likely that US Airways will have to
discontinue its Advantage Fares.
56. American’s executives agree. American believes that Advantage Fares will be eliminated
because of the merger. Internal analysis at American in October 2012 concluded that “[t]he
[Advantage Fares] program would have to be eliminated in a merger with American, as
American’s large non-stop markets would now be susceptible to reactionary pricing from Delta
and United.” Another American executive observed that same month: “The industry will force
alignment to a single approach—one that aligns with the large legacy carriers as it is revenue
maximizing.”
57. US Airways believes that it currently gains “most of its advantage fare value from AA,”
meaning that Advantage Fares provide substantial value for US Airways on routes where
American is the legacy airline offering nonstop service. Post-merger, continuing Advantage
Fares would mean that US Airways was taking that value away from itself by undercutting its
own nonstop prices. Plainly, this would make no sense. Thus, for US Airways post-merger, the
benefits of Advantage Fares would go down, and its costs would go up.
58. By ending Advantage Fares, the merger would eliminate lower fares for millions of
consumers. Last year, more than 2.5 million round-trip passengers—including more than
250,000 passengers from the greater Washington, D.C. area; another 250,000 passengers in the
Dallas-Fort Worth area; half a million passengers in the greater New York City area; and
175,000 passengers from Detroit—bought an Advantage Fare ticket. Hundreds of thousands of
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other passengers flying nonstop on US Airways, particularly from their hubs in Phoenix,
Charlotte, and Philadelphia, benefited from responsive fares offered by the legacy airlines.
2. The Merger Would Likely Lead to Increased Industry-Wide “Capacity
Discipline,” Resulting in Higher Fares and Less Service
59. Legacy airlines have taken advantage of increasing consolidation to exercise “capacity
discipline.” “Capacity discipline” has meant restraining growth or reducing established service.
The planned merger would be a further step in that industry-wide effort. In theory, reducing
unused capacity can be an efficient decision that allows a firm to reduce its costs, ultimately
leading to lower consumer prices. In the airline industry, however, recent experience has shown
that capacity discipline has resulted in fewer flights and higher fares.
60. Each significant legacy airline merger in recent years has been followed by substantial
reductions in service and capacity. These capacity reductions have not consisted simply of
cancellation of empty planes or empty seats; rather, when airlines have cut capacity after a
merger, the number of passengers they carry on the affected routes has also decreased.
61. US Airways has recognized that it benefitted from this industry consolidation and the
resulting capacity discipline. US Airways has long taken the position that the capacity cuts
achieved through capacity discipline “enabled” fare increases and that “pricing power” results
from “reduced industry capacity.” US Airways’ CEO explained to investors in 2006 that there is
an “inextricable link” between removing seats and raising fares.
62. In 2005, America West—managed then by many of the same executives who currently
manage US Airways—merged with US Airways. America West had hubs in Phoenix and Las
Vegas while the former US Airways had hubs in Pittsburgh, Charlotte, and Philadelphia.
Following the merger, the combined firm reduced capacity, including significant cuts in
Pittsburgh and Las Vegas. In 2010, the Chief Financial Officer for US Airways explained:
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We believe in the hub system. I just think there’s too many hubs. If you look
across the country, you can probably pick a few that are smaller hubs and maybe
duplicative to other hubs that airlines have that they could probably get out of. In
our example, we merged with US Airways [and] . . . what we have done over
time, which is unfortunate for the cities, but we couldn’t hold a hub in Pittsburgh
and we couldn’t hold a hub in Las Vegas. So over time we have consolidated and
condensed our operation back, which is really important, condensed it back to our
major hubs.
A post-merger US Airways analysis confirmed that it succeeded in obtaining a “3% to 4%
capacity reduction.”
63. In 2006, on the heels of the America West/US Airways merger, the combined firm
submitted an ultimately unsuccessful hostile bid for Delta Air Lines. US Airways’ management
had concluded that a merged US Airways/Delta could reduce the combined carrier’s capacity by
10 percent, which would lead to higher revenues for the combined firm and for the industry. In
2007, following the rejection of the hostile bid, US Airways’ CEO explained to investors how
the deal would have increased industry profits:
It’s part of what we tried to impress upon people as we were going through our
run at Delta, was that . . . it was good for US Airways [and] good for the entire
industry. We’re going to take out 4% of the industry capacity as we did that.
Everyone’s 2008 numbers would look a (expletive) of a lot better had that
transaction happened . . . .
64. In 2008, Delta merged with Northwest Airlines. Despite promises to the contrary, the
combined airline reduced capacity, including significant cuts at its former hubs in Cincinnati and
Memphis. US Airways’ CEO was “quite happy” to see the merger and advocated for further
consolidation. He explained that an industry structure of “five different hub and spoke airlines
with who knows how many hubs across the United States . . . results in all of us fighting for the
same connecting passengers over numerous hubs.” Left unsaid was that fewer airlines meant
less competition and higher fares.
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65. In May 2010, United Airlines and Continental Airlines announced their planned merger.
The announcement caused speculation about the future of each airline’s hubs, including
Continental’s Cleveland hub. In Congressional testimony, an industry analyst stated that he did
not believe the merger would cause reductions in Cleveland. On June 18, 2010, upon seeing the
testimony, US Airways’ CEO wrote an email to other US Airways executives stating, “[s]urely
these guys [United/Continental] aren’t really planning to keep Cleveland open. I’m hopeful
they’re just saying what they need to (including to [the analyst]) to get this approved.” United
and Continental closed their deal on October 1, 2010. The combined firm has reduced capacity
at nearly all of its major hubs (including Cleveland) and at many other airports where the two
airlines previously competed. Similarly, Southwest/AirTran has reduced service in a number of
its focus cities and on many of AirTran’s former routes following its 2011 merger.
66. The defendants are fully aware of these earlier mergers’ effects. A 2012 American
Airlines analysis concluded that “following a merger, carriers tend to remove capacity or grow
more slowly than the rest of the industry.” US Airways’ management concluded that although
industry consolidation has been a success, as its CEO stated publicly in 2010, the industry had
yet to hit its “sweet spot,” and additional consolidation was needed because the industry
remained “overly fragmented.”
67. A merger with American would allow US Airways to hit the “sweet spot.” For
consumers, however, it would be anything but sweet. US Airways believes that merging with
American “finishes industry evolution” by accomplishing US Airways’ goal of “reduc[ing]
capacity more efficiently.” When first considering a combination with American, US Airways
projected that the merged firm could reduce capacity by as much as 10 percent. Similarly,
American expects that the merger will lead to capacity reductions that would negatively impact
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“communities,” “people,” “customers,” and “suppliers.” Higher fares would be right around the
corner.
3. The Planned Merger Would Likely Block American’s Standalone Expansion
Plans, Thwarting Likely Capacity Increases
68. American does not need this merger to thrive, let alone survive. Before the
announcement of this merger, a key component of American’s standalone plan for exiting
bankruptcy revolved around substantial expansion, including increases in both domestic and
international flights. Thus, in 2011, American placed the largest order for new aircraft in the
industry’s history.
69. US Airways executives feared that American’s standalone growth plan would disrupt the
industry’s capacity discipline “momentum.” In a 2012 internal presentation, US Airways
executives recognized that while “[i]ndustry mergers and capacity discipline expand margins,”
American’s standalone “growth plan has potential to disrupt the new dynamic” and would
“Reverse Industry Capacity Trends.” Moreover, US Airways believed that if American
implemented its growth plans, other airlines would “react to AMRs plans with their own
enhanced growth plans destabilizing industry.” US Airways believed that American’s
standalone capacity growth would “negatively impact” industry revenues and threaten industry
pricing.
70. US Airways thought that a merger with American was a “lower risk alternative” than
letting American’s standalone plan come to fruition because US Airways management could
maintain capacity discipline. American’s executives have observed that “the combined network
would likely need to be rationalized,” especially given the merged carrier’s numerous hubs, and
that it is “unlikely that [a combined US Airways/American] would pursue growth . . . .”
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4. The Merger Would Likely Result in Higher Fees
71. Since 2008, the airline industry has increasingly charged consumers fees for services that
were previously included in the price of a ticket. These so-called ancillary fees, including those
for checked bags and flight changes, have become very profitable. In 2012 alone, airlines
generated over $6 billion in fees for checked bags and flight changes. Even a small increase in
these fees would cost consumers millions.
72. Increased consolidation has likely aided the implementation of these fees. The levels of
the ancillary fees charged by the legacy carriers have been largely set in lockstep. One airline
acts as the “price leader,” with others following soon after. Using this process, as a US Airways
strategic plan observed, the airlines can raise their fees without suffering “market share impacts.”
For example, American announced that it would charge for a first checked bag on May 21, 2008.
On June 12, 2008, both United and US Airways followed American’s lead. Similarly, over a
period of just two weeks this spring, all four legacy airlines increased their ticket change fee for
domestic travel from $150 to $200.
73. The legacy airlines recognize that the success of any individual attempt to impose a new
fee or fee increase depends on whether the other legacies follow suit. When, in July 2009,
American matched the other legacy carriers by raising its checked bag fee to $20, but did not join
the others in offering a $5 web discount, US Airways was faced with the decision of whether to
“match” American by either eliminating its own web discount, or raising its price to $25, with a
$5 discount. US Airways’ CEO gave his view:
I can’t believe I’m saying this, but I think we should stand still on this for now. I
recognize that increases the chances of everyone standing still . . . the [dollars]
aren’t compelling enough for us to stick our necks out first. I do think D[elta] or
U[nited] won’t let them have an advantage, so it’ll get matched – I’m just not sure
we should go first. If a couple weeks go by and no one’s moved, we can always
jump in.
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74. Similarly, when US Airways was considering whether to raise its second checked bag fee
to $100 to match Delta’s fee, a US Airways executive observed: “Wow - $100 is a lot for second
bag. I would think there’s big passenger gag reflex associated with that, but if we can get it, we
should charge it. Do you think we should wait for [United] or [American] to move first,
though?”
75. Conversely, in 2008, when US Airways began charging passengers for soft drinks, the
other legacy airlines did not follow its lead, and US Airways backed off. US Airways’ CEO
explained: “With US Airways being the only network carrier to charge for drinks, we are at a
disadvantage.” Had US Airways not rescinded this fee, it would have lost passengers to the
other legacy airlines.
76. At times, the airlines consider new fees or fee increases, but hold off implementing them
while they wait to see if other airlines will move first. For example, on April 18, United
announced that it was increasing its ticket change fee from $150 to $200. American decided that
“waiting for [Delta] and then moving to match if [Delta] comes along” would be its best strategy.
Over the next two weeks, US Airways, Delta, and American each fell in line, leading a US
Airways executive to observe on May 1: “A[merican] increased their change fees this morning.
The network carriers now have the same $200 domestic . . . change fees.”
77. Post-merger, the new American would likely lead new fee increases. A December 2012
discussion between US Airways executives included the observation that after the merger, “even
as the world’s largest airline we’d want to consider raising some of the baggage fees a few
dollars in some of the leisure markets.”
78. New checked bag fees on flights from the United States to Europe are a likely target.
Both US Airways and American have considered imposing a first checked bag fee on flights to
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Europe but have refrained from doing so. US Airways seriously considered leading such a price
move but was concerned that other airlines would not match: “We would hope that [other
airlines] would follow us right away . . . but there is no guarantee . . . .” Ultimately, US Airways
concluded it was “too small” to lead additional checked bag fees for flights to Europe. Post-
merger, that would no longer be true. The merged firm would be the world’s largest airline,
giving it sufficient size to lead industry fee and price increases across the board.
79. Some fee increases are likely to result from US Airways raising American’s existing fees.
Today, “US Airways generally charges higher bag fees than AA” for travel from the United
States to international destinations. Post-merger, US Airways would likely raise American’s
ancillary fees to US Airways’ higher fee levels as part of a “fee harmonization” process. US
Airways’ own documents estimate that “fee harmonization” would generate an additional $280
million in revenue annually—directly harming consumers by the same amount. A US Airways
presentation from earlier this year analyzing the merger identifies American’s lower bag fees as a
“value lever” that US Airways “will likely manage differently with tangible financial upside.”
The analysis concludes that “[i]ncreasing AA baggage fees to match US creates significant
revenue impact.” US Airways also plans to institute its fees ($40 on average) for the redemption
of frequent flyer tickets on American’s existing frequent fliers, who currently are not charged for
mileage redemption.
80. The merger would also likely reduce the quality and variety of ancillary services offered
by the legacy airlines—a side effect of consolidation anticipated and embraced by US Airways’
CEO. In a 2011 email exchange lamenting the need for US Airways to deploy wireless internet
on all of its airplanes, a senior US Airways executive groused:
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[N]ext it will be more legroom. Then industry standard labor contracts. Then
better wines. Then the ability to book on Facebook. Penultimately, television
commercials. Then, finally, we will pay the NYSE an exorbitant fee to change
our ticker symbol [from LCC].
US Airways’ CEO responded: “Easy now. Consolidation will help stop much of the stupid
stuff but inflight internet is not one of them.”
81. If the planned merger is enjoined, both American and US Airways will have to compete
against two larger legacy rivals, and against each other. The four legacy airlines will not look
exactly the same. As the smallest of the legacy airlines, American and US Airways will have
greater incentives to grow and compete aggressively through lower ancillary fees, new services,
and lower fares.
D. The Merger Would Eliminate Head-to-Head Competition in Hundreds of
Relevant Markets and Entrench US Airways’ Dominance at Reagan National
Airport
82. American and US Airways engage in head-to-head competition with nonstop service on
17 domestic routes representing about $2 billion in annual industry-wide revenues. American
and US Airways also compete directly on more than a thousand routes where one or both offer
connecting service, representing billions of dollars in annual revenues. The merger’s elimination
of this head-to-head competition would create strong incentives for the merged airline to reduce
capacity and raise fares where they previously competed.
83. The combined firm would control 69% of the slots at Reagan National Airport, almost six
times more than its closest competitor. This would eliminate head-to-head competition at the
airport between American and US Airways. It would also effectively foreclose entry or
expansion by other airlines that might increase competition at Reagan National.
84. The need for slots is a substantial barrier to entry at Reagan National. The FAA has
occasionally provided a limited number of slots for new service. In almost all cases, however, a
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carrier wishing to begin or expand service at Reagan National must buy or lease slots from an
airline that already owns them.
85. This merger would thwart any prospect for future entry or expansion at Reagan National.
US Airways, which already has 55% of the airport’s slots, does not sell or lease them because
any slot that goes to another airline will almost certainly be used to compete with US Airways.
The merger would only increase US Airways’ incentives to hoard its slots. Today, US Airways
provides nonstop service to 71 airports from Reagan National, and it faces no nonstop
competitors on 55 of those routes. After this merger, the number of US Airways routes with no
nonstop competition would increase to 59, leaving, at best, only 21 routes at the entire airport
with more than one nonstop competitor. Unsurprisingly, Reagan National is US Airways’
second most-profitable airport.
86. Potential entrants would likely not be able to turn to other airlines to obtain slots. When
allocating their slots, airlines prioritize their most profitable routes, typically those where they
have a frequent, significant pattern of service. If a carrier has a small portfolio of slots, it is
likely to allocate almost all of its slots to its most profitable routes. If it has additional slots
beyond what is needed to serve those routes, a carrier will then work its way down to other
routes or sell or lease those slots to other airlines. Over the last several years, US Airways has
purchased nearly all of the slots that might otherwise be available to interested buyers. Thus,
before this planned merger, American was the only airline at Reagan National with the practical
ability to sell or lease additional slots.
87. In March 2010, American and JetBlue entered into an arrangement in which JetBlue
traded slots at New York’s JFK International Airport to American in exchange for American
trading slots at Reagan National to JetBlue. And until American reached agreement with
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US Airways to merge, it had been negotiating to sell those slots and ten other Reagan National
slots to JetBlue.
88. JetBlue’s entry on four routes, particularly Reagan National to Boston, has generated stiff
price competition. Fares on the route have dropped dramatically. US Airways estimated that
after JetBlue’s entry, the last-minute fare for travel between Reagan National and Boston
dropped by over $700. The combined firm will have the right to terminate the JetBlue leases and
thereby eliminate, or at least diminish, JetBlue as a competitor on some or all of these routes.
89. The merger would also eliminate the potential for future head-to-head competition
between US Airways and American on flights at Reagan National. In 2011, US Airways
planned to start service from Reagan National to Miami and St. Louis, which would directly
compete with American’s existing service. US Airways argued to the Department of
Transportation that this new competition would “substantial[ly] benefit[]” consumers, and so
asked DOT to approve the purchase of slots from Delta that would make the service possible.
DOT ultimately approved that purchase. When it developed its plan to merge with American,
however, US Airways abandoned its plans to enter those markets and deprived consumers of the
“substantial benefits” it had promised.
90. By acquiring American’s slot portfolio, US Airways would eliminate existing and future
head-to-head competition, and effectively block other airlines’ competitive entry or expansion.
VI. ABSENCE OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS
91. New entry, or expansion by existing competitors, is unlikely to prevent or remedy the
merger’s likely anticompetitive effects. New entrants into a particular market face significant
barriers to success, including difficulty in obtaining access to slots and gate facilities; the effects
of corporate discount programs offered by dominant incumbents; loyalty to existing frequent
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flyer programs; an unknown brand; and the risk of aggressive responses to new entry by the
dominant incumbent carrier. In addition, entry is highly unlikely on routes where the origin or
destination airport is another airline’s hub, because the new entrant would face substantial
challenges attracting sufficient local passengers to support service.
92. United and Delta are unlikely to expand in the event of anticompetitive price increases or
capacity reductions by the merged airline. Indeed, those carriers are likely to benefit from and
participate in such conduct by coordinating with the merged firm.
93. The remaining airlines in the United States, including Southwest and JetBlue, have
networks and business models that are significantly different from the legacy airlines. In
particular, most do not have hub-and-spoke networks. In many relevant markets, these airlines
do not offer any service at all, and in other markets, many passengers view them as a less
preferred alternative to the legacy carriers. Therefore, competition from Southwest, JetBlue, or
other airlines would not be sufficient to prevent the anticompetitive consequences of the merger.
94. There are not sufficient acquisition-specific and cognizable efficiencies that would be
passed through to U.S. consumers to rebut the presumption that competition and consumers
would likely be harmed by this merger.
VII. VIOLATION ALLEGED
95. The effect of the proposed merger, if approved, likely will be to lessen competition
substantially, or tend to create a monopoly, in interstate trade and commerce in the relevant
markets, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
96. Unless enjoined, the proposed merger likely would have the following effects in the
relevant markets, among others:
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(a) actual and potential competition between US Airways and American Airlines
would be eliminated;
(b) competition in general among network airlines would be lessened substantially;
(c) ticket prices and ancillary fees would be higher than they otherwise would;
(d) industry capacity would be lower than it otherwise would;
(e) service would be lessened; and
(f) the availability of slots at Reagan National would be significantly impaired.
VIII. REQUEST FOR RELIEF
97. Plaintiffs request:
(a) that US Airways’ proposed merger with American Airlines be adjudged to violate
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18;
(b) that Defendants be permanently enjoined from and restrained from carrying out
the planned merger of US Airways and American or any other transaction that would
combine the two companies;
(c) that Plaintiffs be awarded their costs of this action, including attorneys’ fees to
Plaintiff States; and
(d) that Plaintiffs be awarded such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.
Respectfully submitted this 5
th
day of September, 2013.
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APPENDIX A
CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
• HHIs in this appendix are calculated based on publicly available non-stop and one-
stop airline ticket revenue data for 2012 from Department of Transportation’s Airline
Origin and Destination Survey (DB1B) database, available at:
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/DatabaseInfo.asp?DB_ID=125&Link=0
• Ro
utes are listed only once but include flights at all airports within the metropolitan
area and in both directions. For example, the entry
CITY PAIR
Post-Merger HHI
HHI
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Dallas, TX (DFW)
9,324
4,653
includes flights from Charlotte, North Carolina, to airports in and around Dallas,
Texas, including both Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) and Love Field
(DAL), and it includes flights from both airports to Charlotte.
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APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 1
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Durango, CO (DRO) 10,000 4,742 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 7,448 2,938
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 9,324 4,653 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 6,446 2,932
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10,000 4,647 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 8,116 2,923
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 9,083 4,497 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 6,099 2,905
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 9,040 4,478 Fresno, CA (FAT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 6,197 2,895
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 8,930 4,448 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 7,991 2,892
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 8,659 4,259 Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6,493 2,845
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 8,921 4,205 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6,178 2,843
Miami, FL (MIA) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 9,540 4,079 Austin, TX (AUS) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 6,428 2,839
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 8,174 4,006 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6,861 2,808
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 8,320 3,866 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 6,320 2,801
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 7,704 3,703 Austin, TX (AUS) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 7,074 2,795
Miami, FL (MIA) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 8,042 3,634 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 8,423 2,774
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Miami, FL (MIA) 8,439 3,619 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6,274 2,772
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 8,415 3,612 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 8,978 2,770
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10,000 3,600 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6,793 2,753
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 8,120 3,557 Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 6,867 2,717
Hilo, HI (KOA) - Miami, FL (MIA) 7,329 3,528 Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 6,680 2,700
Hilo, HI (KOA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 7,785 3,418 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Reno, NV (RNO) 6,887 2,672
Kahului, HI (OGG) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 8,888 3,331 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 6,671 2,664
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 7,786 3,312 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 6,057 2,662
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10,000 3,299 Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 5,691 2,656
Monterey, CA (MRY) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6,982
3,277 Columbus, OH (CMH) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8,177 2,621
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 9,185 3,206 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 6,759 2,575
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 8,016 3,185 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 9,515 2,574
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 7,903 3,165 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5,717 2,571
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 7,185 3,164 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5,647 2,567
Palm Springs, CA (PSP) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6,753 3,085 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 5,750 2,503
Austin, TX (AUS) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6,499 3,068 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 6,024 2,501
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 8,372 3,048 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 5,443 2,491
Charleston, WV (CRW) - New York, NY (NYC) 6,407 3,034 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 6,473 2,484
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 6,897 3,033 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 6,077 2,475
Austin, TX (AUS) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 6,547 3,027 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 5,473 2,455
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 10,000 3,022 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6,410 2,455
Austin, TX (AUS) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 6,499 3,006 Hilo, HI (KOA) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 5,588 2,454
Palm Springs, CA (PSP) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 6,968 2,985 Hartford, CT (BDL) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,373 2,444
Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 6,319 2,966 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6,691 2,438
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Charlottesville, VA (CHO) 8,865 2,949 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 8,959 2,428
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 9,061 2,948 Miami, FL (MIA) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 7,592 2,423
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 45 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 2
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Denver, CO (DEN) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,838 2,407 Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 5,457 1,946
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 5,878 2,402 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,466 1,944
Miami, FL (MIA) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 7,973 2,388 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 7,094 1,936
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 7,136 2,383 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Key West, FL (EYW) 4,983 1,931
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 9,203 2,362 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6,048 1,909
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8,140 2,349 Kahului, HI (OGG) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5,275 1,901
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 7,889 2,341 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,883 1,885
Palm Springs, CA (PSP) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5,514 2,313 Nashville, TN (BNA) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,903 1,877
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5,708 2,305 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 5,637 1,845
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5,699 2,278 Charleston, SC (CHS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,230 1,844
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Key West, FL (EYW) 5,573 2,268 Orlando, FL (MCO) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4,514 1,834
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 5,196 2,265 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 7,494 1,833
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 7,026 2,237 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5,844 1,831
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 5,692 2,227 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8,601 1,831
Monterey, CA (MRY) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 7,706 2,199 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 5,038 1,815
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 5,055 2,198 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 8,179 1,805
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 8,393 2,191 Miami, FL (MIA) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 4,355 1,801
Fresno, CA (FAT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 5,756 2,185 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 5,506 1,800
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Westchester County, NY (HPN) 5,037 2,168 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 4,635 1,799
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 6,764 2,137 Austin, TX (AUS) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 5,961 1,791
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 5,169 2,119 Anchorage, AK (ANC) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 7,220 1,789
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 8,326 2,118 Boston, MA (BOS) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5,168 1,780
Columbia, SC (CAE) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 7,648
2,113 Houston, TX (HOU) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 7,185 1,771
Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,765 2,109 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 6,372 1,759
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,757 2,098 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 5,123 1,750
Miami, FL (MIA) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,928 2,090 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5,099 1,728
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,755 2,075 Boston, MA (BOS) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5,173 1,713
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 5,982 2,051 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 4,959 1,705
Detroit, MI (DTW) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 8,834 2,039 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA 5,258 1,702
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Chicago, IL (CHI) 6,818 2,039 Key West, FL (EYW) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4,530 1,697
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5,380 2,037 Austin, TX (AUS) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 5,600 1,693
St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,617 2,022 Austin, TX (AUS) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5,300 1,687
Austin, TX (AUS) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 5,363 2,008 San Diego, CA (SAN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,198 1,678
Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 7,273 2,004 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 4,883 1,669
Boston, MA (BOS) - Key West, FL (EYW) 6,327 1,984 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 7,380 1,667
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,239 1,968 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 7,530 1,665
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Reno, NV (RNO) 8,668 1,953 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 7,087 1,646
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 4,709 1,950 San Juan, PR (SJU) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4,512 1,599
Boston, MA (BOS) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 4,922 1,947 San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,923 1,597
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 46 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 3
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 7,796 1,589 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9,330 1,331
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,835 1,574 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 3,926 1,328
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 4,336 1,571 Boston, MA (BOS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,474 1,327
Buffalo, NY (BUF) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,703 1,555 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 5,134 1,322
Syracuse, NY (SYR) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,609 1,545 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 6,867 1,319
Miami, FL (MIA) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5,610 1,543 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5,268 1,317
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4,711 1,541 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 5,037 1,311
St. Louis, MO (STL) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6,580 1,541 Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 6,869 1,310
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 4,986 1,540 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Jacksonville, FL (JAX) 7,106 1,304
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 4,545 1,531 Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 7,234 1,303
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5,158 1,519 Palm Springs, CA (PSP) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,360 1,300
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5,474 1,517 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,786 1,292
Miami, FL (MIA) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4,566 1,502 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 3,874 1,292
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 5,045 1,492 St. Louis, MO (STL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,306 1,273
Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 9,421 1,489 Nashville, TN (BNA) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,957 1,262
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 6,641 1,489 Austin, TX (AUS) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4,531 1,259
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,437 1,484 Key West, FL (EYW) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 4,746 1,247
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 4,745 1,476 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 5,087 1,237
Richmond, VA (RIC) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,002 1,466 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 5,000 1,225
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,209 1,462 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 3,984 1,225
Savannah, GA (SAV) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 5,215 1,462 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 4,797 1,223
Seattle, WA (SEA) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,824 1,462 Washington, DC (WAS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,214 1,221
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 5,316
1,457 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 8,135 1,218
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 7,993 1,449 Miami, FL (MIA) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3,843 1,217
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 4,974 1,446 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,728 1,215
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,286 1,431 Boston, MA (BOS) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 5,009 1,210
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4,426 1,430 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5,157 1,199
Chicago, IL (CHI) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,065 1,425 St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,006 1,192
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 6,637 1,420 Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,878 1,190
New Orleans, LA (MSY) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,276 1,418 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 4,656 1,187
Durango, CO (DRO) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5,283 1,417 Fresno, CA (FAT) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3,980 1,184
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,010 1,409 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 4,661 1,179
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 5,161 1,397 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,761 1,179
Denver, CO (DEN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,816 1,381 Boston, MA (BOS) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 5,013 1,174
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,340 1,380 New York, NY (NYC) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 3,955 1,174
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,537 1,377 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Washington, DC (WAS) 7,095 1,163
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4,983 1,371 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,582 1,152
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,568 1,370 Columbus, OH (CMH) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,530 1,146
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4,282 1,350 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 4,898 1,145
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 47 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 4
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 6,098 1,143 Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 4,486 1,013
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - New York, NY (NYC) 5,427 1,141 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,763 1,013
Hilo, HI (KOA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,981 1,138 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,164 1,012
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 7,828 1,136 Dallas, TX (DFW) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 8,081 1,010
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 7,652 1,136 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,252 1,009
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,722 1,134 Durango, CO (DRO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5,052 1,007
Tampa, FL (TPA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,663 1,128 San Juan, PR (SJU) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,985 1,000
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 7,647 1,128 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,846 995
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5,393 1,121 Ontario, CA (ONT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,341 992
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4,623 1,115 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5,485 989
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 8,370 1,111 Boston, MA (BOS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,575 979
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 4,729 1,110 Boston, MA (BOS) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 3,387 969
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,773 1,110 Key West, FL (EYW) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5,114 968
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6,199 1,105 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3,559 965
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,835 1,105 New York, NY (NYC) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,967 963
Boston, MA (BOS) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,228 1,097 Knoxville, TN (TYS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,759 958
Miami, FL (MIA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,354 1,097 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,526 954
Miami, FL (MIA) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,213 1,089 Louisville, KY (SDF) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,899 951
Tampa, FL (TPA) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,809 1,089 New York, NY (NYC) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 3,084 950
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 4,812 1,089 Boston, MA (BOS) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 3,066 928
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,998 1,073 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 5,734 926
Fort Myers, FL (RSW) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,835 1,066 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,978 925
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,508
1,059 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,235 917
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 9,283 1,057 Ontario, CA (ONT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4,014 914
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3,640 1,055 Charleston, SC (CHS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5,048 912
New York, NY (NYC) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,353 1,054 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3,776 910
Dallas, TX (DFW) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 6,531 1,050 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Fresno, CA (FAT) 4,549 908
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA)
4,322 1,049 Honolulu, H
I (HNL) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4,515 907
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 6,579 1,049 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 3,588 893
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,751 1,047 Nashville, TN (BNA) - New York, NY (NYC) 3,481 892
Fresno, CA (FAT) - New York, NY (NYC) 4,255 1,046 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,780 890
Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC 4,720 1,043 St. Louis, MO (STL) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,539 890
Austin, TX (AUS) - Columbia, SC (CAE) 4,351 1,043 Birmingham, AL (BHM) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,001 889
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,112 1,038 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,944 885
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Houston, TX (HOU) 4,575 1,036 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5,451 883
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,293 1,027 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 8,258 882
Chicago, IL (CHI) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,623 1,023 Detroit, MI (DTW) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 3,512 879
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,113 1,021 Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4,499 878
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3,462 1,018 Austin, TX (AUS) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 2,915 878
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 48 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 5
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 4,819 878 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,900 782
Boston, MA (BOS) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 5,606 877 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 3,986 777
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 7,386 875 Austin, TX (AUS) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3,835 776
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2,927 874 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,255 773
Richmond, VA (RIC) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,157 873 Key West, FL (EYW) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,876 772
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3,287 869 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,199 772
Detroit, MI (DTW) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 4,561 864 Tucson, AZ (TUS) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,981 767
New York, NY (NYC) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 4,872 863 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 5,375 764
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,657 863 Kahului, HI (OGG) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,700 761
Chicago, IL (CHI) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 6,093 860 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Portland, OR (PDX) 4,765 756
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,567 860 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4,719 751
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,066 855 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 4,050 750
Chicago, IL (CHI) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5,120 853 Seattle, WA (SEA) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,204 748
Austin, TX (AUS) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 4,490 852 San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,570 748
Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,064 848 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 8,376 746
Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5,152 846 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4,736 744
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,902 843 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,272 736
Austin, TX (AUS) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,439 843 Birmingham, AL (BHM) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,586 733
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,700 838 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4,474 729
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,322 838 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4,387 728
Miami, FL (MIA) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 3,305 837 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4,481 726
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,482 832 Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,403 725
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 7,233
823 Miami, FL (MIA) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 3,319 724
Birmingham, AL (BHM) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10,000 821 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 6,576 724
Lexington, KY (LEX) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,181 819 Dallas, TX (DFW) - New York, NY (NYC) 5,162 723
Houston, TX (HOU) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 4,929 817 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 3,744 723
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,930 816 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,651 718
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 5,004 814 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5,224 718
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,847 807 Columbia, SC (CAE) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,277 716
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 2,953 805 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 3,495 714
Fort Myers, FL (RSW) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,127 801 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - New York, NY (NYC) 2,997 712
New Orleans, LA (MSY) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5,674 799 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5,159 711
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3,500 799 Buffalo, NY (BUF) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 3,590 708
Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,887 796 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 4,809 708
Louisville, KY (SDF) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,886 795 Rochester, NY (ROC) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,513 705
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 3,397 785 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 2,905 699
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5,219 784 Miami, FL (MIA) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,278 696
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Denver, CO (DEN) 4,302 784 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 3,707 693
Boston, MA (BOS) - Gainesville, FL (GNV) 5,346 783 Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,411 692
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 49 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 6
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
San Jose, CA (SJC) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,553 689 West Palm Beach (PBI) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,204 633
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 2,862 687 Boston, MA (BOS) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4,454 630
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,045 687 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 4,250 628
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,811 686 San Juan, PR (SJU) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,579 628
West Palm Beach (PBI) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,238 684 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,211 624
Durango, CO (DRO) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 5,017 682 Pensacola, FL (PNS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,492 622
Boston, MA (BOS) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4,044 682 Ontario, CA (ONT) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,569 620
Miami, FL (MIA) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,993 682 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Denver, CO (DEN) 5,343 614
Richmond, VA (RIC) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2,976 681 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,085 612
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,598 678 Orange County, CA (SNA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,356 609
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4,906 676 Columbia, SC (CAE) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4,511 606
Columbus, OH (CMH) - New York, NY (NYC) 3,140 674 Boston, MA (BOS) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,047 606
Nashville, TN (BNA) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9,444 671 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,250 605
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 2,711 670 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - San Francisco, CA (SF 4,599 605
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,511 668 Ontario, CA (ONT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2,910 604
Reno, NV (RNO) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,854 663 Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 2,533 602
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 7,592 662 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 4,494 601
Savannah, GA (SAV) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,952 659 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 2,798 601
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3,419 659 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 3,258 599
Columbia, SC (CAE) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,605 657 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 3,448 596
New York, NY (NYC) - Reno, NV (RNO) 2,886 656 Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,131 594
Orange County, CA (SNA) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2,872 655 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 5,356 591
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,204
655 Key West, FL (EYW) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 6,164 591
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 2,975 655 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,688 589
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,338 653 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 5,385 587
San Juan, PR (SJU) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,177 651 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,257 586
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,816 649 Detroit, MI (DTW) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,339 583
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,270 645 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 4,947 583
Houston, TX (HOU) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 5,285 645 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,543 580
Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,125 645 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 5,020 580
Boston, MA (BOS) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 5,303 644 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 9,177 579
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4,665 643 Boston, MA (BOS) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3,335 577
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 7,197 643 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 6,566 577
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Key West, FL (EYW) 5,219 641 Miami, FL (MIA) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,313 577
Orlando, FL (MCO) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 2,754 640 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,427 575
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5,109 639 Lexington, KY (LEX) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3,795 570
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,545 636 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3,840 567
Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,066 635 West Palm Beach (PBI) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,232 566
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Westchester County, NY (HPN) 4,686 634 Hilo, HI (KOA) - New York, NY (NYC) 2,683 565
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 50 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 7
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Nashville, TN (BNA) - Westchester County, NY (HPN) 4,351 565 Denver, CO (DEN) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 3,415 526
St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 5,261 564 Kapaa, HI (LIH) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,543 526
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,176 564 San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 3,274 524
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,050 564 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,470 523
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 2,857 563 Key West, FL (EYW) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 5,612 523
Fort Myers, FL (RSW) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2,681 563 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Jacksonville, FL (JAX) 2,959 520
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 2,903 560 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,171 520
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Westchester County, NY (HPN) 6,310 560 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,916 519
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,275 558 Boston, MA (BOS) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 2,605 518
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Key West, FL (EYW) 5,545 557 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,343 517
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4,287 555 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4,926 517
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 5,320 555 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5,187 516
Austin, TX (AUS) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 4,018 552 Denver, CO (DEN) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 2,855 516
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 2,905 552 Kapaa, HI (LIH) - New York, NY (NYC) 2,752 514
Monterey, CA (MRY) - New York, NY (NYC) 5,542 551 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3,529 512
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,405 551 Omaha, NE (OMA) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,521 508
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 4,077 548 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,315 504
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,300 548 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,349 504
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,258 548 Miami, FL (MIA) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 2,774 503
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Denver, CO (DEN) 5,189 546 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 3,442 502
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,298 544 Greenville, SC (GSP) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,272 501
Richmond, VA (RIC) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,084 544 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,076 499
Birmingham, AL (BHM) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5,331
543 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4,506 499
New York, NY (NYC) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 2,993 543 Boston, MA (BOS) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 4,509 498
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,132 541 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 6,373 498
Chicago, IL (CHI) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 4,802 539 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 3,832 498
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 2,750 537 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 9,022 496
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4,938 535 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5,346 495
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 6,378 535 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Jacksonville, FL (JAX) 4,522 495
Austin, TX (AUS) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4,193 534 Ontario, CA (ONT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,842 493
Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 5,304 533 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,346 491
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - New York, NY (NYC) 4,830 533 San Jose, CA (SJC) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,037 490
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5,296 533 Orlando, FL (MCO) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,072 488
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 6,243 530 Charleston, SC (CHS) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9,341 488
Montgomery, AL (MGM) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 5,057 529 Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2,590 487
Hilo, HI (KOA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,514 529 Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,342 484
San Diego, CA (SAN) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2,600 528 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 2,869 481
Chicago, IL (CHI) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9,841 528 Denver, CO (DEN) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 5,661 476
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 5,886 527 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Charlottesville, VA (CHO) 6,270 476
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 51 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 8
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4,533 476 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,625 431
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,623 475 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Portland, OR (PDX) 4,077 431
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 3,620 474 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 4,718 431
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4,543 474 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 3,480 431
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,941 474 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5,739 431
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3,105 473 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Reno, NV (RNO) 4,145 430
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 2,507 472 New York, NY (NYC) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 4,727 430
Boston, MA (BOS) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4,142 472 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,540 430
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 4,152 471 Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2,819 429
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Kahului, HI (OGG) 4,738 467 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5,296 428
Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3,411 466
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - San Francisco, CA (SFO
2,619 427
Durango, CO (DRO) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 5,257 466 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2,503 427
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 4,883 465 Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,545 426
Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 4,541 461 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,367 426
Key West, FL (EYW) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4,897 460 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,416 424
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,691 458 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,770 423
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 5,393 456 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 4,118 421
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 5,000 456 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 6,437 419
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,781 455 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 2,632 418
Detroit, MI (DTW) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 2,931 454 Mobile, AL (MOB) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,393 415
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2,629 451 Tallahassee, FL (TLH) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,582 415
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 4,582 451 Key West, FL (EYW) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5,533 415
El Paso, TX (ELP) - New York, NY (NYC) 4,710 450 Mobile, AL (MOB) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4,683 415
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 5,225 450 Ontario, CA (ONT) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3,463 414
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2,829 450 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 5,736 413
Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2,659 447 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,991 413
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 6,103 447 Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 5,549 412
Denver, CO (DEN) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3,761 446 Houston, TX (HOU) - Hilo, HI (KOA) 5,437 411
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 3,421 445 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Key West, FL (EYW) 4,663 404
Miami, FL (MIA) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,141 442 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 3,969 404
Rochester, NY (ROC) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3,431 441 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 4,495 404
Nashville, TN (BNA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,010 440 Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 3,512 403
Houston, TX (HOU) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 3,989 440 West Palm Beach (PBI) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,500 403
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3,029 439 Boston, MA (BOS) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 3,855 402
New York, NY (NYC) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 2,628 439 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 8,844 400
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,193 437 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,540 399
Omaha, NE (OMA) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 4,576 436 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) 5,950 398
Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Columbus, OH (CMH) 3,993 435 San Jose, CA (SJC) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2,594 397
Key West, FL (EYW) - New York, NY (NYC) 3,735 434 Jackson, MS (JAN) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 2,850 397
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 52 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 9
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,460 396 Reno, NV (RNO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4,524 361
Austin, TX (AUS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2,692 396 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 6,035 360
Reno, NV (RNO) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2,700 395 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,407 358
Austin, TX (AUS) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,369 394 Austin, TX (AUS) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,130 357
Monterey, CA (MRY) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 9,083 393 Austin, TX (AUS) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 3,323 357
Boston, MA (BOS) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 3,126 393 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5,869 356
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 3,086 392 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5,688 353
Columbus, OH (CMH) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 3,863 390 Houston, TX (HOU) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 5,668 353
Denver, CO (DEN) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 3,280 390 Boston, MA (BOS) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5,456 352
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5,023 390 Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 3,281 352
Austin, TX (AUS) - Durango, CO (DRO) 3,946 389 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,973 352
Miami, FL (MIA) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4,372 389 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 3,046 351
Austin, TX (AUS) - Charlottesville, VA (CHO) 4,508 386 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 5,040 350
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Columbus, OH (CMH) 4,922 386 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 2,629 350
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 4,075 385 Seattle, WA (SEA) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 3,723 349
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 3,346 385 Austin, TX (AUS) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 3,718 349
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Houston, TX (HOU) 5,565 384 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 4,251 348
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Portland, OR (PDX) 3,828 381 New York, NY (NYC) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 3,091 346
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 5,381 381 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 5,418 346
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,073 380 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 3,326 346
Austin, TX (AUS) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 2,774 379 Denver, CO (DEN) - Kapaa, HI (LIH) 5,728 345
Miami, FL (MIA) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3,155 378 St. Louis, MO (STL) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 5,379 345
Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 5,711
377 Rochester, NY (ROC) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,063 343
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 5,469 377 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,640 342
Lexington, KY (LEX) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,516 377 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 4,500 342
Miami, FL (MIA) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 3,320 375 Fort Myers, FL (RSW) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,930 342
Memphis, TN (MEM) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,175 372 Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2,638 342
New York, NY (NYC) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,200 372 Orange County, CA (SNA) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2,798 341
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,208 372 Reno, NV (RNO) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,938 340
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,675 371 West Palm Beach (PBI) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,470 339
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 5,129 371 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 2,683 339
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,145 371 Charlotte, NC (CLT) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 5,011 338
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 6,997 370 Lexington, KY (LEX) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,416 338
Kahului, HI (OGG) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 3,497 370 Austin, TX (AUS) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4,331 337
Boston, MA (BOS) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 3,563 369 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 4,564 336
Fort Myers, FL (RSW) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,369 368 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4,641 336
Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,702 366 Austin, TX (AUS) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4,641 334
Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,503 365 Houston, TX (HOU) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 2,739 334
Buffalo, NY (BUF) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 2,779 365 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Cincinnati, OH (CIN) 4,797 333
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 53 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 10
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Key West, FL (EYW) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 5,833 332 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 3,358 311
San Jose, CA (SJC) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 5,027 331 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,909 310
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Detroit, MI (DTW) 4,001 330 Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Westchester County, NY (HPN) 4,704 310
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,013 329 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5,288 310
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 3,922 328 Boston, MA (BOS) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 4,955 309
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 5,947 328 San Juan, PR (SJU) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 4,901 309
Boston, MA (BOS) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 5,419 328 Austin, TX (AUS) - Hartford, CT (BDL) 2,809 309
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 2,541 327 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3,185 308
Pensacola, FL (PNS) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,740 327 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2,525 308
El Paso, TX (ELP) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 5,326 327 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 6,035 307
Durango, CO (DRO) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 6,192 326 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3,387 307
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 5,020 326 Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,322 307
Memphis, TN (MEM) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4,462 325 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6,189 307
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,715 324 Columbia, SC (CAE) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 4,527 306
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 3,917 323 San Diego, CA (SAN) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2,797 306
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 4,617 323 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 2,933 306
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,748 321 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 4,195 305
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Miami, FL (MIA) 6,662 321 Boston, MA (BOS) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,024 304
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VP 4,599 321 Dallas, TX (DFW) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 10,000 303
Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Charlotte, NC (CLT) 4,572 321 Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 4,050 303
Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2,599 321 Seattle, WA (SEA) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2,852 301
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,201 320 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Key West, FL (EYW) 3,494 300
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,420
320 Sacramento, CA (SMF) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2,582 299
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,532 319 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4,935 299
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 4,815 318 Austin, TX (AUS) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 2,846 299
Columbus, OH (CMH) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2,615 317 Seattle, WA (SEA) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6,209 298
Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 5,003 317 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - New Orleans, LA (MSY) 6,300 298
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 5,067 317 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4,230 297
St. Louis, MO (STL) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,690 316 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Las Vegas, NV (LAS) 3,885 297
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2,535 316 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 2,818 297
Greenville, SC (GSP) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,094 316 Miami, FL (MIA) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,803 297
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,397 315 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,345 296
Hartford, CT (BDL) - New Orleans, LA (MSY) 2,920 315 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Memphis, TN (MEM) 4,067 295
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF
2,594 314 Hilo, HI (KOA) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,454 295
Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 5,910 313 Monterey, CA (MRY) - Washington, DC (WAS) 5,619 295
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2,844 313 Austin, TX (AUS) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 2,609 295
Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,509 312 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - New York, NY (NYC) 4,484 295
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2,667 311 Boston, MA (BOS) - Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) 4,280 293
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,742 311 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3,986 293
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 54 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 11
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,930 293 Key West, FL (EYW) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 3,483 277
Key West, FL (EYW) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 6,170 293 Houston, TX (HOU) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 4,844 277
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4,099 293 Columbus, OH (CMH) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 4,590 276
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 2,810 293 Louisville, KY (SDF) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,612 275
San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Fort Walton Beach, FL ( 3,454 293 Greenville, SC (GSP) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 2,929 274
Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 5,673 292 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4,131 272
Fort Myers, FL (RSW) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2,676 291 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 2,756 272
Fresno, CA (FAT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 9,574 290 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 2,970 271
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Sacramento, CA (SMF) 2,877 290 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 3,775 271
Chicago, IL (CHI) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 4,618 289 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 4,014 270
Memphis, TN (MEM) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,808 289 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 3,273 270
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,071 289 Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2,657 269
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,884 288 St. Thomas, VI (STT) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 4,436 269
Honolulu, HI (HNL) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 2,888 288 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 3,537 269
Denver, CO (DEN) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 3,382 287 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5,458 268
St. Louis, MO (STL) - St. Croix, VI (STX) 9,073 287 El Paso, TX (ELP) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 6,530 268
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 3,581 287 Columbus, OH (CMH) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2,515 267
Lexington, KY (LEX) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 4,320 287 Lexington, KY (LEX) - New York, NY (NYC) 4,373 267
Jackson, MS (JAN) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 4,719 287 Houston, TX (HOU) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,456 267
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 5,478 287 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Indianapolis, IN (IND 4,591 266
Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,028 286 Nashville, TN (BNA) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4,483 266
Montgomery, AL (MGM) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 6,343 286 Anchorage, AK (ANC) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 5,094 266
Syracuse, NY (SYR) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,611
286 Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,213 265
West Palm Beach (PBI) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3,433 286 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - West Palm Beach (PBI) 4,823 264
Sacramento, CA (SMF) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2,501 285 Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 4,659 264
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 3,660 285 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,883 263
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 4,733 285 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,661 262
Orlando, FL (MCO) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,009 283 Fort Myers, FL (RSW) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2,839 262
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Gainesville, FL (GNV) 6,248 283 Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - Louisville, KY (SDF) 7,869 261
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,346 283 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,029 261
New York, NY (NYC) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 4,681 282 Dallas, TX (DFW) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 4,011 261
Jackson, MS (JAN) - New York, NY (NYC) 3,886 282 Austin, TX (AUS) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 2,913 261
St. Louis, MO (STL) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,562 281 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4,126 261
Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4,864 280 Richmond, VA (RIC) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 2,720 261
Denver, CO (DEN) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 3,366 280 Mobile, AL (MOB) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,410 261
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4,261 280 New Orleans, LA (MSY) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4,232 260
San Antonio, TX (SAT) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,404 279 Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 2,876 260
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 5,509 278 Omaha, NE (OMA) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 2,766 260
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Huntsville, AL (HSV) 5,237 278 Columbia, SC (CAE) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,457 259
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 55 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 12
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Austin, TX (AUS) - Chattanooga, TN (CHA) 5,587 258 Boston, MA (BOS) - Jackson, MS (JAN) 3,999 243
Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 2,777 258 Houston, TX (HOU) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,051 243
Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 3,604 257 Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,832 243
Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) - Fayetteville, AR (X 4,338 257 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3,887 242
Boston, MA (BOS) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 3,307 257 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - New York, NY (NYC) 4,033 242
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VP 6,289 256 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,400 242
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Richmond, VA (RIC) 3,508 256 Miami, FL (MIA) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 2,831 240
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,311 255 Lexington, KY (LEX) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 4,466 240
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3,396 255 Montgomery, AL (MGM) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 5,257 239
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,014 255 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,449 239
Austin, TX (AUS) - Cincinnati, OH (CIN) 3,879 254 Savannah, GA (SAV) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,791 239
Omaha, NE (OMA) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 5,733 254 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 4,082 239
Cleveland, OH (CLE) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 2,934 254 Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 5,092 239
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Omaha, NE (OMA) 3,827 253 Detroit, MI (DTW) - Honolulu, HI (HNL) 4,822 238
Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 5,972 252 Dallas, TX (DFW) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 4,298 237
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 5,590 252 Boston, MA (BOS) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,909 237
Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,133 249 Milwaukee, WI (MKE) - Ontario, CA (ONT) 4,742 237
Boston, MA (BOS) - Mobile, AL (MOB) 4,940 249 Huntsville, AL (HSV) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 3,441 237
Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Miami, FL (MIA) 5,388 249 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,097 236
Austin, TX (AUS) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,141 249 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4,728 236
Gainesville, FL (GNV) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 5,173 248 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Montgomery, AL (MGM) 6,507 236
El Paso, TX (ELP) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 5,400 248 Birmingham, AL (BHM) - Des Moines, IA (DSM) 4,292 235
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 2,916
248 Hartford, CT (BDL) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 2,916 235
Greensboro, NC (GSO) - Houston, TX (HOU) 4,051 248 Cincinnati, OH (CIN) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,927 235
Miami, FL (MIA) - New Orleans, LA (MSY) 4,060 247 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Greensboro, NC (GSO) 5,054 234
Birmingham, AL (BHM) - Key West, FL (EYW) 4,205 247 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Savannah, GA (SAV) 4,517 234
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Jackson, MS (JAN) 3,698 247 Pensacola, FL (PNS) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 3,713 234
Detroit, MI (DTW) - Jackson, MS (JAN) 4,440 247 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2,772 233
Philadelphia, PA (PHL) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 5,660 247 Pensacola, FL (PNS) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 2,909 233
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,892 246 Austin, TX (AUS) - Grand Junction, CO (GJT) 4,674 233
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Fayetteville, AR (XNA) 5,979 246 Hartford, CT (BDL) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 4,929 233
Columbia, SC (CAE) - San Francisco, CA (SFO) 3,428 245 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 3,008 233
Nashville, TN (BNA) - Boston, MA (BOS) 3,105 245 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,945 232
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,488 245 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) 4,397 232
St. Louis, MO (STL) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VPS) 5,733 245 Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Palm Springs, CA (PSP) 3,824 231
El Paso, TX (ELP) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 3,146 244 Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Miami, FL (MIA) 3,410 231
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - El Paso, TX (ELP) 4,450 244 Greenville, SC (GSP) - Little Rock, AR (LIT) 4,770 231
Minneapolis, MN (MSP) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 4,920 243 Grand Junction, CO (GJT) - Orlando, FL (MCO) 4,457 231
Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 3,493 243 Key West, FL (EYW) - Los Angeles, CA (LAX) 6,973 230
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 56 of 57
APPENDIX A -- CITY PAIRS WHERE THE MERGER IS PRESUMPTIVELY ILLEGAL
Appendix Page 13
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
CITY PAIR Post-Merger HHI
∆
HHI
Charlottesville, VA (CHO) - San Antonio, TX (SAT) 4,463 230 Mobile, AL (MOB) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 5,888 217
Jacksonville, FL (JAX) - Kansas City, MO (MCI) 3,399 230 Denver, CO (DEN) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 2,598 215
Key West, FL (EYW) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) 5,747 230 Kansas City, MO (MCI) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6,205 215
Dallas, TX (DFW) - Durango, CO (DRO) 4,052 230 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,556 215
Key West, FL (EYW) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 6,277 229 Columbia, SC (CAE) - Houston, TX (HOU) 3,634 214
Miami, FL (MIA) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,304 229 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Washington, DC (WAS) 4,647 214
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Philadelphia, PA (PHL) 6,700 229 San Francisco, CA (SFO) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 3,547 214
St. Croix, VI (STX) - Washington, DC (WAS) 8,150 229 Jackson, MS (JAN) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 5,568 213
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6,416 229 New York, NY (NYC) - San Jose, CA (SJC) 3,002 213
Boston, MA (BOS) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 5,003 228 Omaha, NE (OMA) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,596 213
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2,935 227 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Indianapolis, IN (IND) 4,240 212
Columbia, SC (CAE) - San Diego, CA (SAN) 4,515 227 Charleston, WV (CRW) - Dallas, TX (DFW) 4,244 212
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF
5,156 226 Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Fort Myers, FL (RSW) 3,859 211
Memphis, TN (MEM) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 4,421 226 Houston, TX (HOU) - Santa Barbara, CA (SBA) 6,373 211
Austin, TX (AUS) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,891 226 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - St. Louis, MO (STL) 3,179 211
Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Rochester, NY (ROC) 3,666 226 Westchester County, NY (HPN) - Milwaukee, WI (MKE) 3,142 210
Charleston, SC (CHS) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,380 226 Pensacola, FL (PNS) - St. Thomas, VI (STT) 5,346 210
San Diego, CA (SAN) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,233 226 Harrisburg, PA (MDT) - Minneapolis, MN (MSP) 3,659 208
Seattle, WA (SEA) - Knoxville, TN (TYS) 3,046 225 Pittsburgh, PA (PIT) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 2,610 207
Sacramento, CA (SMF) - Washington, DC (WAS) 2,898 225 Austin, TX (AUS) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 2,984 207
Denver, CO (DEN) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,975 225 Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Boston, MA (BOS) 3,294 207
Los Angeles, CA (LAX) - Fort Walton Beach, FL (VP 3,815 223 Las Vegas, NV (LAS) - Syracuse, NY (SYR) 2,755 207
Denver, CO (DEN) - Westchester County, NY (HPN) 3,819 223 Houston, TX (HOU) - Monterey, CA (MRY) 6,287 206
Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Raleigh-Durham, NC (RDU) 3,573 223 Jackson, MS (JAN) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 6,244 205
Hartford, CT (BDL) - Lexington, KY (LEX) 4,745 222 Chattanooga, TN (CHA) - New York, NY (NYC) 5,046 205
Atlanta, GA (ATL) - Tucson, AZ (TUS) 4,916 222 Miami, FL (MIA) - Pensacola, FL (PNS) 5,066 204
Monterey, CA (MRY) - Salt Lake City, UT (SLC) 6,650 221 Indianapolis, IN (IND) - Harrisburg, PA (MDT) 3,462 203
Little Rock, AR (LIT) - San Juan, PR (SJU) 6,569 220 Gulfport, MS (GPT) - Greenville, SC (GSP) 4,923 203
San Diego, CA (SAN) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 6,434 219 Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Tallahassee, FL (TLH) 5,030 203
Key West, FL (EYW) - Memphis, TN (MEM) 6,557 219 Phoenix, AZ (PHX) - Washington, DC (WAS) 3,416 202
Des Moines, IA (DSM) - Westchester County, NY (HPN) 3,464 219 Chicago, IL (CHI) - Orange County, CA (SNA) 3,726 201
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Phoenix, AZ (PHX) 4,389 219 Austin, TX (AUS) - Charleston, SC (CHS) 3,275 201
Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - New York, NY (NYC) 3,718 218 Baton Rouge, LA (BTR) - Detroit, MI (DTW) 5,080 201
Jackson, MS (JAN) - Miami, FL (MIA) 4,304 218
Mobile, AL (MOB) - New York, NY (NYC) 4,452 218
Albuquerque, NM (ABQ) - Tampa, FL (TPA) 3,054 218
Boston, MA (BOS) - Gulfport, MS (GPT) 5,213 218
Houston, TX (HOU) - Reno, NV (RNO) 3,525 217
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, VA (ORF) - Seattle, WA (SEA) 3,247 217
Case 1:13-cv-01236-CKK Document 73 Filed 09/05/13 Page 57 of 57
